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THE REALIZING CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

ANDREW LARKIN
Department of Economics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

Because of successful construction of theories in the mathematical, physical, and biological sciences, and because of their unchallenged
technological usefulness, the philosophy of science has concentrated
on the formal and epistemological aspects of sciences. However, the less
formal social sciences have had a greater impact on society. This realizing character of the sciences, i.e., their influence on society through
policy (in the case of the social sciences), has been inadequately studied.
In this paper the normative character of the social sciences is seen from
the perspective of realization. Norms as internal and external criteria,
which are entailed by realization, are introduced and discussed, and the
problem of how norms can be imposed on theories is shown by a
formal model. This leads to a discussion of how the norms derived from
the realizing aspect of a science can be applied, for example, in welfare
economics and policy, the ethical foundations of social sciences Gurisprudence), and theories of justice. Finally, it is shown how these norms
can serve as guidelines for a theory of the historical development of
sciences.

t t t
REALIZA nON DEFINED AND EXEMPLIFIED
From Aristotle through twentieth-century neopositivism,
the philosophy of science has been chiefly concerned with
the epistemological aspect of sciences; theories have been
judged by their ability to describe, explain, and predict. The
culmination of this emphasis on epistemology is two-fold:
(1) sciences have been expected to be value-free, and (2) the
philosophy of science has become meta theoretical, concerned
mostly with semantics and syntax. Using metatheoretical
analysis, philosophers have been able to study two aspects of
theories: (I) the formal aspect, which is pure syntax, and
which is exemplified by mathematics and logic, and (2) the
cognitive aspect, which incorporates semantics or interpretations and is exemplified by the empirical sciences.
However, there are aspects of the sciences other than just
these two. In order to consider additional aspects, I will use
the notion of epitheoretical analysis introduced by Leinfellner
(1974). The epitheoretical mode of inquiry includes not only
the metatheoretical but also the normative, deontic, modal,
ideological, and paradigmatic aspects of sciences. Thus, epi-

theoretical analysis is all-encompassing and allows us to reintroduce ethics into the philosophy of science. Under the
heading of epitheory we can include, along with the formal
and cognitive aspects of theories, the realizing aspect.
Realizing theories are those which have an impact on the
real or physical world outside the science itself, and they thus
include sciences like organic chemistry (which is used in the
production of plastics) and geology (which is used in the
exploration for petroleum), but especially the realizing theories include the social sciences. In the natural sciences, realization is secondary to the purposes of prediction and explanation; but realization is the primary aspect of social theories,
which are developed as much for modifying society as for
predicting and explaining social behavior. As John Maynard
Keynes pointed out, in an often quoted passage,
. . . the ideas of economists and political philosophers,
both when they are right and when they are wrong, are
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist (1964).
Furnishing examples of realization in the social sciences
is, of course, not difficult. The social theory of Karl Marx is a
major influence in the lives of nearly half the people of the
world. And the macroeconomic theory of Keynes has made
billions of dollars worth of difference in the United States
alone since the tax cut of 1963-64, which was argued for on
Keynesian principles. No one would dispute that both Marx
and Keynes had in mind the alteration of the society which
they were studying, but other theories which have also influenced society may have done so inadvertently.
For an example of the unforseen effects of social theories,
I draw upon the book by Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (I957). Polanyi shows that it is possible to view the
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capitalist economic system as an experiment based on the
social theories of John Locke and Adam Smith and their
followers. When Smith wrote his Wealth of Nations in 1776,
the British economy was just beginning to emerge from its
feudal structure, but no one knew what changes to expect
from the development of steam and textile technologies. The
writings of Smith provided a theoretical framework in which
to view the newly emerging socio-economic structure, and
provided guidelines for policy makers. Since any government
is always in a position where it must decide whether to act or
not to act, in this case it eventually chose to follow the Smithian dictum of laissez-faire. Smith'~ economic theory told
policy makers not to intervene in the economy, except insofar
as it was necessary to extricate the government from economic
activity. Another social scientist, William Townsend, aided
this liberal take-over by declaring in 1786 that people could be
looked upon as beasts subject to a natural law inasmuch as
hunger could be used as a motivation for labor (Polanyi,
1957).
The seriousness of the unforeseen realization of Smithian
economics was demonstrated by the consequences of the Industrial Revolution. At first there were still the Poor Laws
which kept displaced people from starvation, but which
violated Townsend's law and prevented mobilization of the
labor force of Britain. After arguments against the Poor
Laws by Malthus, Ricardo, Bentham, and Burke, they were
eventually repealed in 1834. At that point laissez-faire capitalism became the social framework, and human labor became
a commodity in the market economy. Polanyi goes on to show
that the society subject to its economy deteriorates toward
warfare and fascism.
NORMATIVE CRITERIA BASED ON REALIZATION
Since the most familiar aspect of the sciences is their
contribution to knowledge and understanding, we can also
say that a major contribution of the sciences is the reduction
of uncertainty and risk. In the social fields reduction of uncertainty means not only increasing knowledge and understanding by developing scientific theories, but also involves
applying policies in the social realm in order to reduce the
practical uncertainties of everyday life. These policies in turn
imply acts, properly human or moral acts because of their
impact on other people and upon society.
From the three aspects of scientific theories-the formal,
the cognitive, and the realizing-we are able to derive various
sorts of criteria and to impose these on the sciences. The
formal aspect of theories entails such norms as internal consistency, completeness, and problem formation and solution.
The cognitive aspect imposes further criteria such as compatibility with other current theories, accurate prediction, plaUSible explanation, simplicity, and so on. These formal and
cognitive criteria will be called internal criteria (Leinfellner,
1974). Some of these, particularly consistency and complete154

ness, are judged by explicit formal rules developed by phil .
sophers like Aristotle and his successors; other criteria h 0
aVe
not been so rigorously defined.
The aspect of realization also imposes norms on theories
and therefore upon the scientists who do the theorizing. SUch
norms are at least as binding as the internal criteria, but are
even more binding because they derive from the impOsition
of the theory and the theorizing on people and Society. All
internal criteria are entailed by realization because the impact
of a theory upon society requires it to be a good theory in the
formal and cognitive senses. All further criteria imposed uPon
theories and scientists because of the realizing character of the
science will be called external criteria. A few examples of such
external criteria are:

1. The care of experimental animals and plants. In this
paper the concern would mostly be with humans as experi.
mental subjects. Occasionally scientists remind each other to
minimize the pain or damage they inflict on experimental
subjects and to minimize invasions of privacy.
2. The use of statistics and field work. More properly
this is an internal criterion because it involves the truth value
of theoretical statements. However, it is included here because
falsifying experimentation or experimental results in the
social sciences has special consequences due to the impact of
the social theory and because field work and statistics can
affect the field studied (for example, statistical surveys can
influence people's opinions). Within democratic societies there
seem to be built-in safeguards against violating this criterion,
although they function imperfectly.
3. Engagement in prophecy. This topic is included because social scientific prognostications seem to be wrong as
often as they are right. This aspect of the natural sciences is
called prediction and is also an internal criterion. But when
employed by social scientists, prediction often has an escala·
ting effect and sometimes results in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The realizing character of social theories thus requires care in
the use of prophecy.
4. The use of publication. In some countries (e.g., Iran,
during the reign of the Shah) access to publication is per·
mitted only after the scientist has submitted his work to a
government-appointed committee for approval. In the demo·
cracies (e.g., North America and Western Europe), it is more
usual for each publishing company to have a committee for
permitting or denying publication; often this committee is
selected by a group of scientists. No matter what the regime,
the potential impact of a social-scientific work imposes special
norms on those who would use publications and on those whO
would control access to them.
5. Funding research and development. The aspect of
realization also provides important standards for judging

whether certain research or development projects should be
funded. Our present society is being very pressed over such
uestions as research into recombinant-DNA and the develop~Jent of nuclear energy. The formal and cognitive aspects of
theories tell us all too little about the value of theories which
provoke such questio~s; however, t~e realizing aspec~ per~ts
the philosophy of SCIence to consIder these questlOns m a
Systematic way and to employ the principles of ethics which
have been developed over the centuries.

sions can then be drawn which apply to the object of the
science. A typical illustration of atomism is the principle that
the pressure exerted by a volume of gas is due to the aggregate
motion of the gas molecules. In this case atomism works, but
an example of where it will not work is the attempt to derive
the properties of water from the properties of hydrogen and
oxygen.
Atomism has involved not only the decomposition of the
objects of sciences, but has also led to the greater and greater
subdivision of scientific disciplines, which I have just mentioned.
Finally, atomism employs as one of its tools the infinitesimal
calculus, developed by Newton for studying the motion of
projectiles. But the calculus relies on smooth curves or continuous functions which are seldom found in the social world.

6. Prescription. Consider such statements as "a dollar
received today is more valuable than a dollar received tomorrow" or "the single goal for the firm is the maximization of
profit." Such innocuous-looking assumptions, which have
been introduced into economic theories in order to simplify
the real world enough to theorize about it, often become
prescriptive outside the theory. A similar case was brought up
earlier--the imposition of laissez-faire on British and other
societies. Although positivistic philosophers would look upon
these statements as conditional statements, practical people,
who have few alternatives to turn to, are tempted to see such
statements as answers to practical problems. This realizing aspect of social theories imposes a special standard on social
scien tis ts.

Holism, on the other hand, begins with a concept of a
system which consists of interrelated components, which are
themselves systems, and which also relate to elements of the
environment, which is everything outside the system that has
influence on the system. Holism and systems theory allow and
compel scientists to see problems in their entirety, and this in
turn should permit more successful theorizing and more fruitful problem solving.

IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY

CONCLUSION

The aspect of realization also compels us to question the
methodology that has been traditional in social-scientific
theorizing. During the past couple of centuries there has been
a gradual increase in the number of social disciplines: economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, psychology,
geography, and the like. These disciplines have in turn subdivided simultaneous with the increase in the number of
scientists and the amount and depth of research. But the
problems of the world, which the social sciences purport to
addre,s, are not so neatly divided. While one group of scientists is studying urban crime, another is studying unemployment, a third group is studying warfare, and another is studying the increase in mental illness. The subdivision of the
academic disciplines almost precludes the possibility of viewing social relationships in their entirety and of seeing the
intercUlmections among social problems.

The principles of systems theory in turn give two reasons
for searching for and using the best methodology and for
satisfying the external criteria entailed by the realizing character of the social sciences. (1) Realizing theories affect
society as a whole as well as the individual people who are the
elements of society. (2) Realization also affects the environment of a society because any open system reacts with its
environment (Ackoff, 1974). Hence, when we come to apply
external criteria to the social sciences, we must base these
norms on the simultaneous socio-ecological impact of the
social science.
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